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Abstract
This article examines (i) how retailers position private label products, (ii) why
private labels are sold in some product categories but not in others, and why
some national brand products may have di¢ culty in accessing retailersshelves,
(iii) why some private label products are positioned as "premium" brands, and
(iv) how consumerssurplus and total welfare are a¤ected by private labels. We
nd that private label positioning leads to less di¤erentiation in product category,
which structurally changes a retailers product line in return. Consumer welfare
and total welfare are lower.
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1 Introduction
Private Labels (PLs), also known as store brands, are typically goods sold under a
retailers brand which can be the retailers own name or a name created exclusively by
that retailer. Private-label goods are available in a wide range of industries from food to
cosmetics. According to a report by Nielsen (2014), private label products account for
18 percent of the U.S. and Canada retailing markets in value (2013 data) and more than
twice this gure in some European countries (Switzerland at 45%, United Kingdom at
41%, Spain at 41%, 2013 data), and are now well developed in most countries throughout
the world. In India, PLs constitute 5% of sales (2014 data; Nielsen report, 2014), and
"they grew 27% between 2012 and September 2014".
However, PL market shares and their positioning with respect to National Brand
(NB) products exhibit widespread diversity across product categories. For example,
for 38 countries the PLs aggregated value shares were, on average, 32 percent in re-
frigerated food, ve percent in personal care products and two percent in baby food
(ACNielsen, 2005). In addition, while PL products were priced, on average, 31 per-
cent lower than their manufacturer counterparts, the average price di¤erentials on a
category basis ranged from 46 percent in personal care products to just 16% for refrig-
erated food. Interestingly, there was no direct correlation between the lower price and
the largest market share: while the value shares of PLs were 32 percent in refrigerated
food and two percent in baby food, refrigerated food and baby food were priced 16
percent lower and 24 percent lower respectively, than their manufacturer counterparts.
Moreover, at the individual country/category level, "there were a number of examples
where PL products had an average price that was actually higher than the manufacturer
brands" (ACNielsen, 2005). One reason for this, is that while PL products can be po-
sitioned as lower-cost alternatives to NB products, some retailers have also positioned
their PL brands as "premium" brands. Retailers such as Tesco in the U.K. and Loblaws
in Canada, for example, have now both added these PL o¤erings to their product as-
sortments.1 With growing market shares of PL products and/or the premium brand
1Alongside the Tesco Value brand (usually depicted by blue and white stripes), Tesco has a premium
quality brand, Tesco Finest, which also spans most product areas in the store (ACNielsen, 2005).
Overall, Tesco has also developed Tesco Organics with a variety of organic foods from cookies to
sausages, and Tesco Free, including over 150 products which are gluten, wheat or milk free.
Since Presidents Choice (PC) products were launched in 1984, Loblaws has expanded the brand
beyond a price-point focus in order to o¤er quality, health-focused alternatives to consumers in Canada,
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positioning of some PL brands, some categories exhibit a level of tension between NB
producers and retailers, and NB suppliers may face problems in accessing the shelves of
retailers.
To date, the literature on this subject has studied a number of reasons for a retailer to
launch PL products with two main motivations suggested: rst, segmenting the market,
and second, strengthening the bargaining power of a retailer.2 In respect to market
segmentation, by di¤erentiating the products in one product line with several brands,
rms are able to weaken the competition with their rivals, which improves their market
power (see Shaked and Sutton, 1982, for example; see also Brander and Eaton, 1984,
Champsaur and Rochet, 1989 and Gilbert and Matutes, 1993 in which rms choose their
product lines3). Launching a PL is also considered as an instrument to strengthen the
retailers bargaining power against NB suppliers. Earlier studies include Mills (1995),
Bontems et al., (1999) and Mills (1999).4 For example, Mills (1995) shows that PL
products are introduced because they induce a price concession of NB producers and,
hence, limit the market power of NB producers. In other words, when a new substitute
is supplied by the retailer and competes with the existing good, the problem of double
marginalization is reduced. When PL products are introduced (or because of the threat
of supplying PLs), industry surplus and consumer surplus are higher, which results in
as well as the United States, the Caribbean, Hong Kong and Israel (for example PC Blue Menu, PC
Organics, PC Mini Chefs; ACNielsen, 2005).
See also Caprice (2000), for examples in France (Carrefour with "Filière Qualité", "Escapades Gour-
mandes").
2Other reasons have been used to justify the production of PL products. For example, Bergès and
Bouamra-Mechemache (2012) shows that NB manufacturers may use their excess production capacities
to produce PL products. They study the retailers and NB manufacturers PL strategy for production in
a setting featuring endogenous store brand quality, bargaining power, possible di¤erences in production
technology and potential capacity constraints for the NB manufacturer. Depending on the structure of
capacity constraint (applying to both products or to PL only), they nd that the retailer may prefer to
choose an independent rm for the production of PL product whereas the NB manufacturer is chosen
in the case of excess capacity.
In an environment of imperfect information where consumers do not know the quality of the PL
product before purchase, Bergès-Sennou and Waterson (2005) and Chen and Xu (2015) also examine
what determines the presence or absence of private labels (as experience goods) in groceries.
3These latter papers dene multi-stage games in which rms rst choose their product lines and
then compete on the market.
4More recently, see also Gabrielsen and Sorgard (2007) with brand loyalty consumers. Other studies
such as Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) have also considered brand loyalty consumers. By contrast,
Bergès-Sennou (2006) has considered store loyalty consumers. In any case, consumersloyalty a¤ects
the retailers bargaining position, but also the retailers assortment, of available products.
See also Bergès et al., (2004) for a survey.
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higher social welfare (as long as xed costs are low).
Results from empirical studies are more ambiguous on this issue. Some studies nd
that the price of NB products decreases when PL products are introduced (or when the
market share of PLs is larger), while others nd the opposite.5 For example, Ward et
al., (2002) show that an increase in the PL market share is consistent with an increase
(or no change) in the price of national brands. While theoretical studies suggest that
the impact of PLs on the retail prices of NB products is negative, results from empirical
studies are far from clear. Moreover, while previous theoretical papers assume that NB
suppliers use linear pricing, recent empirical analysis shows that non-linear pricing is
prevalent, especially when suppliers contract large retailers.6
In this paper, we consider a simple setup where the producer of a NB sells its brand
through a single retailer and the retailer considers the choice of the characteristics of its
PL product. As it is common to argue that there are quality di¤erences between NB
and PL, we assume that both products are vertically di¤erentiated. The marginal cost
of the PL product is increasing and convex in the quality (objective quality). Initially,
we consider the industry outcome when the quality of PL product is chosen in order to
maximize industry surplus. Then, we restrict attention to the case where the quality
of the PL product is lower than the quality of the NB product and study the following
three stage game where rst, the retailer chooses the quality of the PL product, second,
the NB producer o¤ers a non-linear tari¤, and nally, the retailer sets retail prices.
The timing of the game is familiar as contracting decisions present a lower degree of
irreversibility than quality choices. As the retailer owns and controls the brand, the
choice in regard to quality is made by the retailer. This timing underlines an essential
feature of PL products: the characteristics of PL products are xed by retailers and not
by manufacturers. Moreover, these decisions are strategically taken in order to enable
retailers to increase their prots. As expected, because the retailer chooses the quality
of the PL product so as to maximize its disagreement payo¤s, the quality is higher than
the quality which maximizes industry prots. This result highlights one major di¤erence
when we compare the quality choice of a NB producer and the quality choice of a retailer
5We can cite, for example, Putsis (1997), Cotterill et al., (2000), Chintagunta et al., (2002) and
Ward et al., (2002); more recently, see also Bontemps et al., (2008).
6See Villas-Boas (2007) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) for seminal papers, showing evidence of such
contracts in vertical contracting.
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on PL. While the former considers the incremental contribution of its good to the surplus
of the product category, which leads to industry surplus maximization, the latter takes
into account its disagreement payo¤. As the quality chosen by the retailer for the PL
product is higher, the total demand which is supplied in the product category is smaller.
Moreover, the retail price of the NB product is unchanged in this setting. We then show
that consumer surplus and total welfare are lower when the retailer chooses the quality
of its PL product in comparison with the situation in which the quality would be chosen
optimally. This is because total demand is lower in the former case.
Thus, we characterize in detail the retailers product line when the retailer positions
its PL product. In particular, we show that the demand for the NB product may be
zero in some cases at equilibrium, which raises the issue of access to shelves for the
NB producers.7 By contrast, the PL product is not sold in some cases at equilibrium.
Another situation can arise, in which the retailer may choose the quality of the PL prod-
uct which is higher than the quality of the NB product, which may explain premium
PL products in some product categories. We then discuss our results with respect to
di¤erent scenarios: rst, we consider an alternative game in which the NB manufacturer
can ex-ante commit to contract terms (before PL positioning), and second, we allow for
competition between NB producers. In the former scenario, the retailer not unsur-
prisingly chooses PL quality which maximizes industry surplus. In the latter scenario,
similar insights arise when the competition between NB manufacturers is erce. In both
cases, PL positioning now allows the retailer to price discriminate between consumers.
Our results are in line with the ndings of Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004).8
Using a bargaining framework, they study a retailers decision whether to carry an
additional NB or a PL and, if the retailer chooses to introduce the latter, where in
product space to locate the PL product. They show that the strategic positioning of a PL
product in a category changes the bargaining over supply terms between a retailer and
a NB manufacturer in that category, and clearly di¤ers from the strategic positioning
of another NB manufacturer. PL positioning causes a reduction of di¤erentiation in
product category. However, in their analysis, PL and NB products are always supplied
7The result is due to the niteness property (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton,
1983) in vertically di¤erentiated markets. In such an analysis, the number of products with a positive
market share depends on the degree of consumer heterogeneity.
8See also, Choi and Coughlan (2006) for similar insights.
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at equilibrium (or another NB product and the original NB). They assume constant
marginal cost of production for both PL and NB products. By contrast, we assume
increasing marginal cost in quality for the PL product. We can thus study in detail the
equilibrium product line of the retailer with respect to the positioning of the PL product.
We nd that the PL product or the NB product are not sold in some cases. Moreover,
while their model is not designed to study premium PL products such as Presidents
Choice for Loblaws in Canada, our model allows us to consider this PL positioning.
There is now a literature which investigates the role of PLs in oligopolistic down-
stream markets (Avenel and Caprice, 2006; Colangelo, 2008 and more recently Bonroy
and Lemarié, 2012). For example, Avenel and Caprice (2006) consider two competing
retailers; they study a vertical di¤erentiation model where a high quality item (i.e., a
NB) is o¤ered by a monopolist, while low quality items (i.e., PL products) are o¤ered
by a competitive fringe. They show that the equilibrium product line depends on the
positioning of PL products. When PL and NB products are close substitutes, the NB
manufacturer prefers to deal with both retailers in order to a¤ect retailersoutside op-
tions, that is, the prots that retailers obtain with their PL products. By contrast, in
this paper, we assume a monopoly retailer, leaving aside the issue of how PL products
interact with retailer competition. In doing so, we focus on interbrand competition (i.e.,
competition between products at one retailer), when the retailer is a monopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. We
analyze PL positioning when the industry is fully vertically integrated in Section 3 (this
case will be used as a benchmark case). Section 4 solves the model and presents results.
Consumer surplus and total welfare are also studied. We discuss results in Section 5
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The industry consists of an upstreammarket and a downstreammarket. In the upstream
market, a manufacturer produces a national brand (NB) product with quality sNB at
a constant marginal cost cNB. In the downstream market, a monopolistic retailer buys
and resells the NB product. The retailer, meanwhile, has the option of producing and
selling a private label (PL hereafter) product with quality sPL. The retailer chooses
6
the quality of the PL product. The marginal cost of producing a PL does not depend
on the quantity, but is increasing and convex in the quality level. We assume that
the marginal cost of producing sPL is given by CPL (sPL) =
s2L
2
. We do not restrict
the analysis by having more assumptions on costs. In particular, we will say that the
retailer benets from a competitive advantage when for identical levels of quality the
marginal cost of producing a PL is smaller than the marginal cost of producing the
NB product: CPL (sNB) < cNB (, cNBsNB <
sNB
2
). On the contrary, the retailer faces a
competitive disadvantage when CPL (sNB) > cP (, cNBsNB >
sNB
2
). We suppose that there
are no barriers to entry to the production and sales for the PL product. Accordingly,
there are a large number of upstream rms that can produce the PL product and the
retailer purchases the PL product at marginal cost CPL (sPL).9 Consumers have perfect
information about the quality of products.
We suppose that the contract between the NB manufacturer and the retailer takes
the form of a two-part tari¤ T = (w;F ), which is proposed by the manufacturer, where
w and F denote the wholesale price and the xed fee charged to the retailer, respectively.
The retailer sells the NB product and the PL product at pNB and pPL (in the event
where the retailer accepts the contract proposed by the manufacturer).
Following the quality-choice model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), we assume that
consumers are indexed by their preferences , with  uniformly distributed on an interval
[0; a] (density, 1
a
). There is a unit mass of consumers. Consumers at di¤erent locations
on the interval [0; a] have di¤erent tastes for quality. Specically, the net surplus of a
consumer  is given by U (; pk; sk) = sk   pk (k = NB;PL) if he purchases a product
k of quality sk and zero otherwise. By denoting i the good with higher quality and j
the other product, the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent about buying the good i
and the good j is given by ij =
pi pj
si sj , while the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent
about buying the low quality good and not buying at all is determined by j =
pj
sj
. We
9An alternative interpretation would be to consider that the retailer is vertically integrated and
produces PL product at CPL (sPL) :
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can write the demands as follows:
Di (pi; pj) =
8><>:
0 if pi  bpi (pj) or if pi  asi
a  pi pj
si sj if epi (pj)  pi < bpi (pj)
a  pi
si
if pi < epi (pj)
Dj (pi; pj) =
8>><>>:
0 if pj  epj (pi) or if pj  asj
pi pj
si sj  
pj
sj
if bpj (pi)  pj < epj (pi)
a  pj
sj
if pj < bpj (pi)
with bpi (pj) = a (si   sj) + pj and epi (pj) = pj sisj (i; j = NB;PL).
In the case where the retailer does not accept the o¤er of the NB manufacturer, we
denote pNB = +1 the retail price of the NB product. It can also be optimal for the
retailer to not sell the PL product in case PL and NB products are close substitutes,
and we denote pPL = +1 the retail price of PL product in this case.
We study the following game:
- at stage one, the retailer chooses the quality sPL of its PL product;
- at stage two, o¤ers (w;F ) are made by the NB manufacturer to the retailer,
which the retailer either accepts or rejects; and
- then, at stage three, the retailer sets retail prices pPL and pNB.
The timing of the game is not surprising as contracting decisions present a lower
degree of irreversibility than the choice of quality. In particular, the development of
PL products is subject to various stages, such as the denition of specications, a call
for tenders to the production sector, manufacturing by the chosen supplier, and quality
control on the production site, which suggests a long process and thus constitutes an
irreversible choice. By contrast, the terms of a contract can be modied more easily and
therefore have a lower degree of irreversibility.10 The retailer owns and controls the PL
brand which results in a quality choice of PL product sPL made by the retailer.
In the next section, we consider the situation where the industry is fully vertically
integrated and PL positioning maximizes industry surplus. We will use this as a bench-
mark case.
10Other demand side factors may also explain a relative rigidity in product quality. Consumer quality
assessment may involve a certain degree of subjectivity, thus making the product quality change process
relatively long, in comparison with contract designing.
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3 PL positioning in a fully vertically integrated in-
dustry
Industry surplus involves sales from PL and NB products, that is, the maximization
problem is given by:
Max I (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB) = (pPL   CPL (sPL))DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
+ (pNB   cNB)DNB (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB) ,
which results in the following rst-order conditions in retail prices:
(pPL   CPL (sPL)) @DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@pPL
+DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
+ (pNB   cNB) @DNB (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@pPL
= 0,
(pPL   CPL (sPL)) @DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@pNB
+(pNB   cNB) @DNB (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@pNB
+DNB (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB) = 0.
We obtain pePL (sPL; sNB) and p
e
NB (sPL; sNB).
11
First-order condition in the quality of the PL product results in:
(pPL   CPL (sPL)) @DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
+(pNB   cNB) @DNB (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
  C 0PL (sPL)DPL (pPL; pNB; sPL; sNB) = 0.
Substituting pNB and pPL by, pePL (sPL; sNB) and p
e
NB (sPL; sNB), and solving for sPL,
we obtain the quality of the PL product which is optimal from the point of view of
11Simple calculations lead to
pePL (sPL) =
1
2
(CPL (sPL) + asPL) and peNB (sPL) =
1
2
(cNB + asNB)
for DPL (:) > 0 and DNB (:) > 0.
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industry surplus. Let sPL denote this optimal quality. s

PL depends crucially on the
size of the market a and the relative production cost of the NB product cNB
sNB
. Without
restricting the range of parameter values, three scenarios should be distinguished: I,
sPL = bsPL, II, sPL = sPL and III, sPL = sPL with sPL < bsPL < sPL.12 Figure 1
summarizes the optimal product line for the di¤erent ranges of parameter values a and
cNB
sNB
.
To facilitate the exposition of the di¤erent scenarios, we will distinguish two cases
according to which the PL product faces a competitive disadvantage or benets from a
competitive advantage with respect to the NB product.
Fig. 1: Optimal product line in the benchmark case.
12Critical values are given by:
bsPL = 23a; sPL = 3sNB  
p
9s2NB   16cNB
4
and sPL =
a+ 2sNB +
p
4s2NB + a
2   2asNB   6cNB
3
:
Conditions that dene these critical values can be found in Appendix A.
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In the former case, cNB  CPL (sNB) which translates into cPsP 
sP
2
, the PL product
faces a competitive disadvantage. If the parameter values fall into region I (i.e., if a
is relatively low), the vertically integrated structure sells the PL product only (bsPL).
As the market size is relatively small (a  cP
sP
), the relative production cost of the NB
product is too high so as to ensure a positive margin for the NB product and, only the
PL product is sold. On the other hand, if the market size is very high (i.e., in region
III ), the vertically integrated structure sells both products, but the optimal quality of
the PL product is set higher than the quality of the NB product (sPL > sP ). As the
market size is high (a > ea1  cNBsNB), there exist opportunities to provide an optimal
quality of the PL higher than the quality of the NB product. Some consumers will
accept paying a very high price for higher quality. Finally, if the market size falls into
an intermediate region (i.e., in region II ), the vertically integrated structure sells both
products with the optimal quality of the PL product smaller than the quality of the NB
product (sPL < sNB). Here (i.e., for
cNB
sNB
< a  ea1  cNBsNB), the vertically integrated
structure uses the PL product as a tool for market segmentation. Consumers with a
high willingness to pay buy the NB product while consumers with a lower willingness
to pay buy the PL product.
In the latter case, cNB > CPL (sNB) which translates into cNBsNB >
sNB
2
, the PL
product benets from a competitive advantage with respect to the NB product. If
cNB
sNB
> 9
16
sNB, the relative production cost of the NB product is relatively high so
that it will be sold only when the market size is relatively high (a > ea2  cNBsNB). In
this case (i.e., in region III ), the vertically integrated structure will sell both products
with the optimal quality of the PL product higher than the quality of the NB product
(sPL > sNB). On the other hand, if the market size is smaller (a  ea2  cNBsNB), only
the PL product is sold with sPL = bsPL (i.e., in region I ). The market size is not large
enough to ensure that both products are sold and it is only the PL product which is
sold because it benets from a competitive advantage. Then, we consider the range
of parameters where cNB
sNB
is intermediate (sNB
2
< cNB
sNB
 9
16
sNB), and whereby there
may exist opportunities to sell both products, NB and PL, with the optimal quality of
the PL product smaller than the quality of the NB product (region II: sPL < sNB).
This case arises, even if the PL product benets from a competitive advantage. We
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obtain this case when the market size falls into an intermediate region (for a such thatea3  cNBsNB < a  Minnea1  cNBsNB ;ea4  cNBsNBo). The vertically integrated structure uses
the PL product as a tool for market segmentation by setting the optimal quality of the
PL product smaller than the quality of the NB product. By contrast, if a  ea3  cNBsNB
(i.e., region I ), only the PL product is sold (bsPL) and if a > Minnea1  cNBsNB ;ea4  cNBsNBo
(i.e., in region III ), both products are sold and the optimal quality of the PL product
is set higher than the quality of the NB product (sPL > sNB). In the former case, the
market size is not large enough to ensure that both products are sold and, only the
PL product will be sold as the NB product faces a competitive disadvantage. In the
latter case, the vertically integrated structure uses the NB product as a tool for market
segmentation, and the optimal quality of the PL product is set higher than the quality
of the NB product.13 The range of product quality is due to the competitive advantage
of the PL product compared to the NB product (cNB > CPL (sNB)).
We summarize our results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Depending on the range of parameter values (see Figure 1 for details),
the product line of a fully vertically integrated industry is given by:
- Region I, sPL = bsPL, the PL product is sold only;
- Region II, sPL = s

PL, both PL and NB products are sold with s

PL < sNB; and
- Region III, sPL = s

PL, both PL and NB products are sold, but with s

PL > sNB.
We have:
bsPL = 23a; sPL = 3sNB  
p
9s2NB   16cNB
4
and sPL =
a+ 2sNB +
p
4s2NB + a
2   2asNB   6cNB
3
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Threshold values in a are detailed in the Appendix.
In the following, we will focus on the set of parameter values corresponding to the
region II : the vertically integrated structure uses the PL product as a tool for market
13An intermediate area also arises in this latter case, where Min
nea1  cNBsNB  ;ea4  cNBsNB o < a < ea2
for which, PL product is sold only (region I, sPL = bsPL).
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segmentation by setting the optimal quality of the PL product smaller than the quality
of the NB product.14 If the motivation for PL products is to segment the market, we
should expect to have an equilibrium where the quality of the PL product chosen by the
retailer is smaller than the quality of NB product. However, as we will see, the choice
of the retailer fundamentally changes the equilibrium product line.
4 Equilibrium product line
We solve backwards the previous three-stage game: the retailer chooses the quality level
of the PL product, the supplier of the NB product proposes a two-part tari¤ which is
either accepted or rejected by the retailer and, lastly, the retailer sets the retail prices.
At stage three, the maximization problem of the retailer consists of setting pNB and
pPL to maximize its prots:
D (pPL; pNB; w; sPL; sNB)  F ,
where F represents the xed fee that the retailer pays to the supplier. The maxi-
mization problem leads to peNB (w; sPL; sNB) ; p
e
PL (w; sPL; sNB) and the retailer obtains
D (p
e
PL (w; :) ; p
e
NB (w; :) ; w; sPL; sNB)  F .
Then, at stage two, the two-part tari¤ set by the supplier can be obtained from the
following maximization problem:
Maxw;F (w   cNB)DNB (pePL (w; :) ; peNB (w; :) ; sPL; sNB) + F
s:t: D (p
e
PL (w; :) ; p
e
NB (w; :) ; w; sPL; sNB)  F  D (pePL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) ,
where D (pePL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) represents the disagreement payo¤ of the retailer. This
yields the familiar solution, whereby the participation constraint of the retailer holds
14We will thus focus on the range of parameters for which:
If cNBsNB <
sNB
2 , we have a such that
cNB
sNB
< a  ea1  cNBsNB  ;
If cNBsNB >
sNB
2 , we have a such that ea3  cNBsNB  < a  Minnea1  cNBsNB  ;ea4  cNBsNB o (with cNBsNB <
9
16sNB).
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with equality and the xed fee that the retailer pays to the supplier is:
F = D (p
e
PL (w; :) ; p
e
NB (w; :) ; w; sPL; sNB)  D (pePL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) .
The maximization problem becomes:
Maxw (w   cNB)DNB (pePL (w; :) ; peNB (w; :) ; sPL; sNB)
+D (p
e
PL (w; :) ; p
e
NB (w; :) ; w; sPL; sNB)  D (pePL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) ,
which is equivalent to maximizing the joint-prots of the NB manufacturer and the
retailer because the retailers disagreement payo¤ D (pePL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) does not
depend on the wholesale price. Using the envelope theorem, the wholesale price is set
to the marginal cost of production of the NB product, that is, w = cNB.
Finally, at stage one, the retailer chooses the quality of the PL product to maximize
its prots which is equal to its disagreement payo¤:
MaxsPLD (p
e
PL (sPL) ;+1; sPL) .
Solving the maximization problem above leads to sPL =
2
3
a. In any case, the quality
sPL of the PL product is chosen higher than the optimal quality s

PL (with s

PL = s

PL,
maximizing industry prots). In fact, the retailer chooses the quality of its PL product
in order to strengthen its bargaining power, instead of segmenting the market. We will
show that PL positioning structurally changes the equilibrium product line. Depending
on parameter values, four regions should be distinguished:
- Region A, both products are sold, and the product line is such that sPL < sNB:
(sPL; sNB) with s

PL < sNB;
- Region B, the demand for the PL product is zero, and only the NB product is sold:
(; sNB);
- Region C, both products are sold, but the product line is such that sPL > sNB:
(sPL; sNB) with s

PL > sNB; and
- Region D, the demand for the NB product is zero, and only the PL product is sold:
(sPL;).
Figure 2 below summarizes the equilibrium product line for the di¤erent ranges of
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parameter values. We distinguish between the case where the retailer faces a competitive
disadvantage ( cNB
sNB
 sNB
2
) and the case in which the retailer benets from a competitive
advantage ( cNB
sNB
> sNB
2
).
Fig. 2: PL positioning and product line.
In the former case, if the parameter values fall into region A (i.e., if a is relatively
low: a  a2

cNB
sNB

= 3 cNB
sNB
), both products are sold. The quality of the PL product
is closer to the quality of the NB product (compared to the solution which maximizes
industry surplus), but both qualities are sold at the equilibrium. By contrast, if a is
higher: a > a2

cNB
sNB

=
3

3sNB+
p
9s2NB 16cNB

8
, only the NB product is sold (region B,
a2

cNB
sNB

< a  a1

cNB
sNB

) or both products are sold, with sPL > sNB (region C, i.e.,
a > a1

cNB
sNB

). In the former region, there will exist opportunities to provide a smaller
quality of the PL product. However, as the retailer does not internalize the joint-prots
with the NB manufacturer and only considers its disagreement payo¤, the demand for
the PL product is zero at the end. This result is related to the niteness property
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as mentioned in the Introduction (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton,
1983). In vertically di¤erentiated markets, the number of products with a positive
demand depends on the degree of consumer heterogeneity. When the two qualities are
close, which is the case in region B, the more e¢ cient quality preempts the less e¢ cient
quality. As the retailer faces a competitive disadvantage, the less e¢ cient quality is the
PL product, and the PL product is not sold at equilibrium. PL positioning structurally
changes the retailers product line.15 In the latter region, the relative cost of the PL
product is close to the relative cost of the NB product. At the equilibrium, the demand
for the PL product becomes positive, but now the equilibrium product line is such that
sPL > sNB.
In the latter case cNB
sNB
> sNB
2
, the retailer benets from a competitive advantage,
whereby the demand for NB is zero if a is relatively low (region D, i.e. a  a2

cNB
sNB

).
As above, this result is due to the niteness property. The two qualities are close and
the more e¢ cient quality preempts the less e¢ cient quality. As the retailer now benets
from a competitive advantage, it is the NB product which is not sold at equilibrium.
The result is that the supplier of the NB product is denied access to the retail market,
which was not the case in the fully integrated vertical industry. PL positioning implies
that the NB manufacturer is preempted from the market. On other hand, if the market
size is relatively high and the relative cost of the PL product is close to the relative
cost of the NB product, the demand for the NB product now becomes positive. The
equilibrium product line is such that sPL > sNB (region C, i.e. a > a2

cNB
sNB

). In this
region, the PL product is a premium brand and the NB product is used to segment the
market.
We summarize results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Assume parameter values are in region II, depending on the range of
parameter values (see Figure 2, for details), equilibrium product line with sPL =
2
3
a >
sPL is given by:
- Region A, both products are sold, and the product line is such that sPL < sNB:
(sPL; sNB) with s

PL < sNB;
- Region B, the demand for the PL product is zero, and only the NB product is sold:
(; sNB);
15See also Bacchiega and Bonroy (2015) for a use of this property in vertical relationships in a di¤erent
context.
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- Region C, both products are sold, and the product line is such that sPL > sNB:
(sPL; sNB) with s

PL > sNB; and
- Region D, the demand for the NB product is zero, and only the PL product is sold:
(sPL;).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The supplier and the retailer face a coordination problem. Instead of considering
industry surplus, the retailer maximizes its outside option so as to strengthen its bar-
gaining position, which results in a higher quality of the PL product. Quality ine¢ ciency
implies that total demand in the category is smaller. The ine¢ ciency we highlight is
due to the timing of the game we have chosen. However, this timing is familiar as
contracting decisions present a lower degree of irreversibility than quality choices.
Another essential feature of PL products is that their characteristics are xed by
retailers and not by manufacturers. Suppose, instead, that the quality decision is taken
by another supplier in stage 1, and the NB manufacturer and this supplier o¤er two-part
tari¤s in stage 2 (o¤ers are public and are made simultaneously). The quality chosen by
this supplier now maximizes industry surplus. To understand the di¤erence between the
two games, it is straightforward to show that contracts are still e¢ cient because of two-
part tari¤s and the supplier now considers the incremental contribution of its good to the
surplus of product category. Let I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB; sPL; sNB) I (+1; cNB;; sNB)
denotes its incremental contribution to the product category. In maximizing its incre-
mental contribution, the supplier maximizes industry surplus as I (+1; cNB;; sNB),
which is the monopoly prot related to the NB product, independent of sPL: By con-
trast, the retailer in positioning its PL product considers I (CPL (sPL) ;+1; sPL;)
alone, which is its outside option.16 The coordination problem we highlight arises as
it is the retailer who sets the characteristics of PL products. As previously seen, PL
positioning structurally changes product lines.
In our setting, total demand at equilibrium decreases due to PL positioning but the
retail price of the NB product is unchanged. We now turn to the analysis of consumer
surplus and total welfare.
Consumer surplus and welfare analysis
16See also Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) for similar point.
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As there is no double marginalization at the equilibrium of this game, the results in
terms of consumer surplus and welfare will only depend on the comparison of levels of
the quality for PL product between the vertically integrated structure and the situation
where the retailer chooses the quality. We denote by CS (sNB; sPL) the consumer surplus
and byW (sNB; sPL) the total welfare. The consumer surplus (with si < sj) is given by:
CS (si; sj) =
Z pei pej
si sj
pe
j
sj
 
sj   pej

d +
Z a
pe
i
 pe
j
si sj
(si   pei ) d,
and the total welfare by:
W (si; sj) = I (si; sj) + CS (si; sj) ,
with I (si; sj) representing industry surplus,
I (si; sj) =
Z pei pej
si sj
pe
j
sj
 
pej   cj

d +
Z a
pe
i
 pe
j
si sj
(pei   ci) d.
Simple calculations show that I (si; sj) = 2CS (si; sj). An implication of this obser-
vation is that the quality of the PL product, which maximizes the industry surplus (i.e.,
the vertically integrated structure), maximizes the total welfare. Eventually, the quality
of the PL product chosen by the retailer decreases the total welfare. The analysis above
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Quality choice of the PL product by the retailer is detrimental to the
consumer surplus and the total welfare.
Proof. See the text above.
As noted in the Introduction, some economists have argued that PLs would enhance
consumer surplus and total welfare. While such an argument may apply when the
double marginalization problem between NB producers and retailers applies, our analysis
instead shows that the quality choice of PL products by the retailer is always detrimental
to consumer surplus and total welfare. Our results are di¤erent because the double
marginalization problem is avoided when two-part tari¤s are used by suppliers.
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5 Discussion
We have shown that the low di¤erentiation between PL products and NB products
can be explained by the fact that retailers use PL products as a bargaining tool with
NB manufacturers. Suppliers can adopt several strategies by which to respond to this
situation. In the following subsection, we discuss these strategies. Moreover, while we
have shown that ine¢ cient PL positioning arises when the bargaining power of the NB
is large, we will show that this ine¢ ciency decreases when the bargaining power of the
NB manufacturer decreases. This issue is discussed in the latter subsection.
5.1 PL positioning and manufacturer counterstrategies
It is straightforward to show that the solution to the coordination problem we focus on
above is based on the inversion of the order of the steps which are, on the one hand, PL
positioning and, on the other hand, contract o¤ers.
We now assume the following timing in place of the previous one. The NB manufac-
turer proposes a two-part tari¤ that the retailer accepts or rejects, the retailer chooses
the quality of PL product and, nally, sets the retail prices.
The quality chosen by the retailer is thus optimal from the point of view of in-
dustry surplus.17 The objectives of the NB manufacturer and the retailer are now
aligned: once the contract is accepted, the distributor chooses its PL quality so as to
maximize industry surplus. The prot of the retailer is unchanged compared to the
previous game and the prot of the supplier is larger. While the retailer still obtains
I (CPL (s

PL) ;+1; sPL;), the NB manufacturer prots are now:
I (CPL (s

PL) ; cNB; s

PL; sNB)  I (CPL (sPL) ;+1; sPL;) ,
which are larger than:
I (CPL (s

PL) ; cNB; s

PL; sNB)  I (CPL (sPL) ;+1; sPL;) ,
as I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB; s

PL; sNB) > I (CPL (s

PL) ; cNB; s

PL; sNB) by denition. The
problem of coordination we discussed earlier is harmful to the supplier alone.
17A formal proof of the result is available upon request.
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While the order of the stages we consider initially takes into account the PL process,
the reversal of the steps presented shows certain partnership policies that some suppliers
have put in place. In order to reestablish the optimal segmentation of the demand in
the product category, some suppliers have developed two types of products: rst, a
type of product that is considered innovative and is supported by major advertising
campaigns, and second, lower quality products which have a reduced sales potential.
The two categories of products are sold under two di¤erent brands, the rst under NB
and the second under PL. Listing the entire product range implies leaving the retailer
its outside option which is still given by the prot it would make, in the absence of these
products from the NB manufacturer. This supplier-retailer partnership can solve the
quality ine¢ ciency highlighted above.18 Other forms of partnerships between suppliers
and retailers can be reinterpreted to solve this coordination problem. Retail category
management for example can be seen as a tool to e¢ ciently segment product category.
Depending on its bargaining power, the retailer can adopt such management to increase
the prots of a given product category and then increase its prots if its bargaining
power is su¢ ciently large. By leaving one supplier which has the management of the
product category, the retailer segments the market.
Another key feature in the retailers quality choice of PL product is the competition
between NB manufacturers. The following subsection shows how erce competition
between NB manufacturers may in return lead to optimal segmentation in the product
category. The retailer will segment the market in positioning PL product in place of
strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis NB manufacturers.
5.2 PL positioning and NB manufacturerscompetition
We take up the initial structure of the game, with the di¤erence that the NB upstream
sector is now made up of two homogeneous producers for the NB product instead of
one: P1 and P2 with sNB1 = sNB1 = sNB. The cost structure considered for these
manufacturers is as follows: while rm 1, that is, P1, produces at cost cNB1, rm 2, that
is, P2, produces at a higher cost (cNB2  cNB1). The cost di¤erence between rms 1
and 2 can be interpreted as the level of competition between NB manufacturers. If the
18Similar insights have been addressed by Bergès and Bouamra-Mechemache (2012) in another con-
text. In the case of excess production capacity, the manufacturer can use its excess capacity by supplying
the retailer with a PL product and thus facilitate the entire product range listing.
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di¤erence is zero, the rms are in perfect competition; by contrast, when the di¤erence
is large, rm 2 does not constitute an alternative to the e¢ cient NB manufacturer (rm
1).19
Consider now the following game: in the rst stage, the retailer chooses the quality of
PL product to be produced by a competitive fringe whose marginal cost of production is
increasing and convex in quality; in stage two, P1 and P2 make o¤ers in two-part tari¤s,
the retailer chooses one of these o¤ers; and nally, in stage three, the retailer sets retail
prices.
As previously, contracts proposed by the NB manufacturers are e¢ cient from the
point of view of the vertical structure for a given level of quality for PL product (whole-
sale prices are respectively equal to marginal costs).20 The retailer chooses the e¢ cient
manufacturer, the one whose cost is lower (i.e. P1). Then, the quality chosen by the
retailer corresponds to the quality that maximizes the prots of the vertical structure
formed by the retailer and the least e¢ cient manufacturer (P2) in place of the more
e¢ cient manufacturer (P1). Let I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB2; sPL; sNB) denote the prots of the
vertical structure formed by the retailer and the least e¢ cient manufacturer (P2). The
outside option of the retailer is now given by I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB2; sPL; sNB) instead of
I (CPL (sPL) ;+1; sPL;) which were the prots it would obtain without an alter-
native NB manufacturer. Simple comparative statics show that the quality chosen by
the retailer is an increasing function in the cost of the least e¢ cient manufacturer (P2)
and the retailers prots decrease in this.21 In other words, when the cost di¤erence
between NB manufacturers decreases, PL quality decreases, approaching the quality
which is chosen for an optimal segmentation in the product category. The retailers
prots increase as this cost di¤erence narrows.22
19Another possible modeling is to consider a Generalized Nash Negotiation between the NB manu-
facturer and the retailer. Both approaches lead to similar results.
20A formal proof of the result is available upon request.
21The prots of the retailer are given I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB2; sPL; sNB) with sPL which maximizes
these prots. By using F.O.C in sPL, we have @sPL@cNB2 =  
 @DNB=@sPL
@2I=@s2PL
which is positive with
@DNB=@sPL < 0, at least if sPL < sNB . Moreover, by totally di¤erentiating retailers prots, we
obtain @I@cNB2 =  DNB(:) < 0.
22If we have a relationship between NB manufacturers competition and di¤erentiation within the
product category, we can also address the issue of the introduction of PL products. Let us now suppose
that the introduction decision requires expenditures of a xed cost, which is independent of the quality.
It is thus possible to show that the retailers gain in introducing PL product (from which he will choose
the quality) is an increasing function of the di¤erence in production costs between NB manufacturers.
21
6 Conclusion
We have studied a model of quality choice for PL products. The benchmark case helps
us to determine the environment in which PL products could be used to segment the
market. We have shown that the two dimensions which are the segmentation of the
market and strengthening the bargaining power of the retailer play in opposite directions.
More specically, while the segmentation of the market suggests the di¤erentiation of
the NB product and the PL product, the quality choice of the PL product made by the
retailer mimics the quality of the NB product. The quality di¤erentiation between the
PL product and the NB product is smaller: the retailer chooses a quality which raises
its disagreement payo¤ and enables it to receive a larger share of the joint-prot with
the NB supplier.
Furthermore, we have determined the equilibrium retailers product line in an envi-
ronment in which the PL product would be used to segment the market. We have found
that the choice of the retailer fundamentally changes the equilibrium product line. PL
products with higher quality than NB products may emerge. But, more importantly,
we have demonstrated that the result may in some cases be that PL products are sold
only, and that the demand for NB products is zero. In other cases, we have shown that
PL products are not sold in the category.
Moreover, while the focus is often on the impact of PL products on NB products
retail prices, our analysis suggests that the impact is zero. However, total demand is
smaller due to less di¤erentiation in quality, which results in lower consumer surplus
and lower total welfare.
The retailer and the NB supplier face a coordination problem, which can be avoided
if the supplier can propose a contract before PL product positioning. Optimal product
lines can also be restored if NB suppliers are in erce competition. In both cases, the
PL product is thus used to segment the market instead of strengthening the bargaining
Let I (CPL (sPL) ; cNB2; sPL; sNB) I (+1; cNB2;; sNB) denote the retailers gain in introducing
the PL product. Simple calculations show that this gain increases in the di¤erence in production costs
between NB manufacturers @[I(CPL(sPL);:) I(+1;:)]@cNB2 =   [DNB (CPL (sPL) ; :) DNB (+1; :)] > 0
with [DNB (CPL (sPL) ; :) DNB (+1; :)] < 0 because of imperfect substitution between PL and NB
products. Understanding why PLs are introduced in some product categories and not in others could
be related to the degree of competition between NB manufacturers. While PLs would be expected in
categories with little competition between NB manufacturers, they would be absent in categories with
erce competition between NB manufacturers. If the reasoning holds in our setting, other dimensions
need to be considered, as NB products are not often homogeneous goods.
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power of the retailer.
One remaining issue not addressed here is that retailers compete and that the PL
product introduction may play a role in retailerscompetition. As cited in the Intro-
duction, some papers have investigated this question, however, the competition between
retailers is far from simple. In practice, many customers engage in multi-stop shopping
and rely on several retailers in order to fulll their needs. While some customers are one-
stop shoppers, other customers are multi-stop shoppers. PL products play a role in the
shopping behavior of consumers: for example, we can assume that consumers who buy
PL products are more often one-stop shoppers than multi-stop shoppers. There is now a
literature on competitive multi-product pricing using multi-stop shopping and one-stop
shopping behavior (see for example, Chen and Rey, 2012 and Johnson, 2016). Using
these frameworks as building blocks to revisit PL positioning when retailers compete
would be interesting, however, we leave this task for further investigation.23
23Some authors have used consumer shopping costs to revisit vertical relationships issues. See Caprice
and von Schlippenbach (2013), Johansen and Nilssen (2016) and Caprice and Shekhar (2017).
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We determine the quality of PL which is optimal from the point of view of industry
surplus.
In the case, sNB   sPL > 0, demand functions for sNB and sPL will respectively be
given by:
DNB =

a  p
e
NB   pePL
sNB   sPL

> 0 and DPL =

peNB   pePL
sNB   sPL  
pePL
sPL

> 0,
with peNB =
1
2
(cNB + asNB) and pePL =
1
2
(CPL (sPL) + asPL) and we will look for the
solution in sD of the following function:
I (p
e
PL; p
e
NB; sNB; sPL) = (p
e
NB   cNB)DNB + (pePL   cPL (sPL))DPL.
However, we do not restrict attention to the situation sNB   sPL > 0 even if, at the
end, we will focus on this scenario.
We distinguish two cases according to which the retailer faces a competitive disad-
vantage (Case 1: CPL (sNB)  cNB) or benets from a competitive advantage (Case 2:
CPL (sNB) > cNB).
Case 1: CPL (sNB)  cNB,
The retailer faces a competitive disadvantage: cNB
sNB
 sNB
2
:
We have to dene several threshold values in sPL to explicit the demand functions.
Let bsPL, esPL and eesPL denote these threshold values:
bsPL < sNB < esPL < eesPL.
The demand for the low quality is positive if sPL < bsPL; bsPL is given by solving peNB pePLsNB sPL 
pePL
sPL
= 0 for sPL. The result is bsPL = 2cNBsNB . Now, assume that sPL > sNB, there exist
values of sPL according to which the demand for sPL is positive ifMinsPL>sNB
pePL peNB
sPL sNB <
a. Let ba1  cNBsNB denote the threshold value in a such that MinsPL>sNB pePL peNBsPL sNB = a
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and let bbsPL = Argmin pePL peNBsPL sNB denote the corresponding value in quality. We obtainbbsPL = sNB +psNB   2cNB and ba1  cNBsNB = pePL peNBsPL sNB sPL=bbsPL . The result is:
- if a  ba1  cNBsNB, the demand for sPL is zero for any sPL such that sPL > sNB;
- if a > ba1  cNBsNB, there exist values of sPL such that, for sPL > sNB, the demand
for sPL is positive. In particular, if sPL 2
esPL;eesPL the demand is positive. esPL andeesPL are obtained by solving pePL peNBsPL sNB = a for sPL in case a > ba1  cNBsNB, leading to:
esPL = a pa2 + 2cNB   2asNB and eesPL = a+pa2 + 2cNB   2asNB.
The function, we have to maximize is locally concave in sPL.
 1.1: a  cNB
sNB
:
The demand for NB product is zero. The optimal quality for PL product solves:
[pePL   CPL (sPL)]
@DPL (:; sPL)
@sPL
=
@CPL (sPL)
@sPL
DPL (p
e
PL;+1; sPL)
withDPL (pePL;+1; sPL) = a  p
e
PL
sPL
, which results in sPL = bsPL with bsPL = 23a. Industry
prots are given by: I (bsPL;) = 227a3:
 1.2: cNB
sNB
< a  ba1  cNBsNB :
The demand for PL product is zero if sPL > sNB. The optimal quality for PL
product solves:
[pePL   CPL (sPL)]
@DPL (:; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
+ [peNB   cNB]
@DNB (:; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
=
@CPL (sPL)
@sPL
DPL (p
e
PL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB)
withDNB (pePL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB) = a p
e
NB pePL
sNB sPL andDPL (p
e
PL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB) =
peNB pePL
sNB sPL 
pePL
sPL
, which results in sPL = s

PL where s

PL =
3sNB 
p
9s2NB 16cNB
4
leads to following in-
dustry prots:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
4c2NB + sNB (s
3
PL + 4a
2 (sNB   sPL))  4sNB (s2PL + 2a (sNB   sPL))
16 (sNB   sPL)
.
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 1.3: a > ba1  cNBsNB.
There exists an interval for sPL > sNB for which the demand in PL product is
positive, that is, when sPL 2
esPL;eesPL. Two local solutions have to be compared:
sPL < sNB from previous analysis and s

PL > sNB that we will dene. Let s

PL denote
the new local solution which is obtained by solving:
[pePL   CPL (sPL)]
@DPL (:; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
+ [peNB   cNB]
@DNB (:; sPL; sNB)
@sPL
=
@CPL (sPL)
@sPL
DPL (p
e
PL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB)
withDPL (pePL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB) = a p
e
PL peNB
sPL sNB andDNB (p
e
PL; p
e
NB; sPL; sNB) =
pePL peNB
sPL sNB 
peNB
sNB
for sPL 2
esPL;eesPL. sPL is given by sPL = a+2sNB+p4s2NB+a2 2asNB 6cNB3 which
results in following industry prots:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
sPL (4c
2
NB   4cNBsPLsNB + sNB (s3PL + 4a2 (sPL   sNB)  4asPL (sPL   sNB)))
16sNB (s

PL   sNB)
.
The comparison of I (sPL; sNB) and I (s

PL; sNB) leads to threshold value in a. Letea1  cNBsNB denote this value, such that:
I (s

PL; sNB)  I (sPL; sNB) if ba1cNBsNB

< a  ea1cNB
sNB

,
and I (sPL; sNB) < I (s

PL; sNB) if a > ea1cNBsNB

.
We thus obtain: sPL = s

PL if ba1 < a  ea1  cNBsNB and sPL = sPL if a > ea1  cNBsNB.
To sum up, we will then focus on cNB
sNB
< a  ea1  cNBsNB such that sPL = sPL,
which corresponds to the situation in which both products, with sPL < sNB are sold
when we consider the point of view of industry surplus; the corresponding optimal
quality for the low quality product is given by sPL = s

PL.
Now, we consider the case where the retailer, instead of facing a competitive disad-
vantage benets from a competitive advantage (Case 2: CPL (sNB) < cNB).
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Case 2: CD (sNB) < cNB,
The retailer benets from a competitive advantage: cNB
sNB
> sNB
2
.
As previously, we have to dene several threshold values in sPL to explicit demand
functions. Let esPL = a  pa2 + 2cNB   2asNB and bsPL = 2cNBsNB denote these threshold
values; we have esPL < sNB < bsPL as the retailer now benets from a competitive
advantage. esPL is obtained by solving peNB pePLsNB sPL = a for sPL. The high quality good (i.e.
NB product) receives zero demand if sPL > esPL with sPL < sNB; bsPL is given by solving
pePL peNB
sPL sNB  
peNB
sNB
= 0 for sPL when sPL > sNB. In the latter case, the good with quality
sNB receives zero demand if sPL < bsPL for sPL > sNB: At the end, sNB good receives
zero demand if sPL 2 (esPL; bsPL) with esPL < sNB < bsPL.
The function, we have to maximize is locally concave in sPL.
 2.1: a  cNB
sNB
.
As previously (see 1.1), the demand for NB product is zero. The result is sPL = bsPL
with bsPL = 23a and industry prots are I (bsPL;) = 227a3.
 2.2: cNB
sNB
< a  3cNB
sNB
.
Let start with cP
sNB
 9
16
sNB.
2.2.1: cNB
sNB
< a  3cNB
sNB
and cNB
sNB
 9
16
sNB.
Two sub-cases should be considered (depending on a):
2.2.1.1 the objective function admits a local solution in sD, which is a global solution.
Only one good is sold to consumers and, as PL product benets from a competitive
advantage, only this good is sold. In details, sPL =
3sNB 
p
9s2NB 16cNB
4
is larger thanesPL, resulting in, when we study objective function, an increasing part when sPL < esPL
and, then, a part which admits a local solution for sPL > esPL.
2.2.1.2 the objective function may admit several local solutions in sPL, that we will
compare.
Let ea3  cNBsNB denote this threshold in a; ea3  cNBsNB is obtained by solving for a:
peNB   pePL
sNB   sPL

sPL=s

PL
= a with sPL =
3sNB  
p
9s2NB   16cNB
4
.
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We start with:
2.2.1.1: cNB
sNB
< a  ea3  cNBsNB and cNBsNB  916sNB.
The demand for NB product is zero. The result is bsPL = esPL with bsPL = 23a which
leads to following industry prots I (bsPL;) = 227a3 (as in 2.1).
Then,
2.2.1.2: ea3  cNBsNB < a  3cNBsNB and cNBsNB  916sNB.
Potentially, three local solutions can emerge:
sPL with s

PL =
3sNB 
p
9s2NB 16cNB
4
< esPL, resulting in:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
4c2NB + sNB (s
3
PL + 4a
2 (sNB   sPL))  4sNB (s2PL + 2a (sNB   sPL))
16 (sNB   sPL)
,
bsPL = 23a resulting in I (bsPL;) = 227a3, and
sPL =
a+2sNB+
p
4s2NB+a
2 2asNB 6cNB
3
resulting in:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
sPL (4c
2
NB   4cNBsPLsNB + sNB (s3PL + 4a2 (sPL   sNB)  4asPL (sPL   sNB)))
16sNB (s

PL   sNB)
.
We will proceed in two steps:
Let ea2  cNBsNB denote the value in a such that I (bsPL;) = I (sPL; sNB), we have :
I (bsPL;)  I (sPL; sNB), if ea4  cNBsNB < a  ea2  cNBsNB and I (bsPL;) < I (sPL; sNB),
otherwise (i.e., for ea2  cNBsNB < a  3cNBsNB ): The analysis is made for cNBsNB  916sNB.
Thus, if ea3  cNBsNB < a  ea2  cNBsNB, we have to compare I (bsPL;) and I (sPL; sNB).
Let ea4  cNBsNB denote the value in a such that I (sPL; sNB) = I (bsPL;). The result
is: I (sPL; sNB)  I (bsPL;) and sPL = sPL, if ea3  cNBsNB < a  ea4  cNBsNB; otherwise
(i.e., ea4  cNBsNB < a  3cNBsNB ), we get I (sPL; sNB) < I (bsPL;) and sPL = bsPL (for
a  ea2  cNBsNB).
Then, if ea2  cNBsNB < a  3cPsNB , we have to compare I (sPL; sNB) and I (sPL; sNB).
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Using the analysis above (see 1.3), we have
I (s

PL; sNB)  I (sPL; sNB) if a  ea1cNBsNB

and I (sPL; sNB) < I (s

PL; sNB) if a > ea1cNBsNB

.
Previous analysis results in sPL = s

PL if
3cNB
sNB
< a  ea1  cNBsNB and sPL = sPL if
a > ea1  cNBsNB, when cNBsNB  916sNB (for a > ea2  cNBsNB).
2.2.2: cNB
sNB
< a  3cNB
sNB
and cNB
sNB
> 9
16
sNB:
We have to compare two local solutions, bsPL = 23a resulting in I (bsPL;) = 227a3
and sPL =
a+2sNB+
p
4s2NB+a
2 2asNB 6cNB
3
resulting in:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
sPL (4c
2
NB   4cNBsPLsNB + sNB (s3PL + 4a2 (sPL   sNB)  4asPL (sPL   sNB)))
16sNB (s

PL   sNB)
.
Using the analysis above (see 2.2.1.2), the result is (for cNB
sNB
> 9
16
sNB): I (bsPL;) 
I (s

PL; sNB) and s

PL = bsPL if cNBsNB < a  ea2  cNBsNB; otherwise (i.e., ea2  cNBsNB < a 
3cNB
sNB
), we obtain I (bsPL;) < I (sPL; sNB) and sPL = sPL.
 2.3: a > 3cNB
sNB
:
Let start with cNB
sNB
 9
16
sNB.
2.3.1: a > 3cNB
sNB
and cNB
sNB
 9
16
sNB.
Two local solutions sPL and s

PL have to be compared (with s

PL =
3sNB 
p
9s2NB 16cNB
4
and sPL =
a+2sNB+
p
4s2NB+a
2 2asNB 6cNB
3
). Using the analysis above (see 1.3), we have:
I (s

PL; sNB)  I (sPL; sNB) if a  ea1cNBsNB

,
and I (sPL; sNB) < I (s

PL; sNB) if a > ea1cNBsNB

.
We thus obtain: sPL = s

PL if
3cNB
sNB
< a  ea1  cNBsNB and sPL = sPL if a > ea1  cNBsNB,
with cNB
sNB
 9
16
sNB:
2.3.2: a > 3cNB
sNB
and cNB
sNB
> 9
16
sNB:
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We have a local solution sPL which is a global solution. We thus obtain s

PL = s

PL
which results in:
I (s

PL; sNB) =
sPL (4c
2
NB   4cNBsPLsNB + sNB (s3PL + 4a2 (sPL   sNB)  4asPL (sPL   sNB)))
16sNB (s

PL   sNB)
.
To sum up, we will consider in the following analysis:
ea3cNB
sNB

< a Min
ea1cNB
sNB

;ea4cNB
sNB

with
cNB
sNB
<
9
16
sNB
( cNB
sNB
< 9
16
sNB is used here, when cNBsNB >
sNB
2
, which corresponds to the case where the
retailer benets from a competitive advantage). In this situation, both products (with
sPL < sNB) are sold when considering industry surplus and the PL quality is given by
sPL = s

PL. Q.E.D.
B Proof of Proposition 2
The quality chosen by the retailer is given by the following F.O.C:
[pePL   CPL (sPL)]
@DPL (:; sPL)
@sPL
=
@CPL (sPL)
@sPL
DPL (p
e
PL;+1; sPL)
with DPL (pePL;+1; sPL) = a   p
e
PL
sPL
, which results in sPL =
2
3
a (= bsPL, see Proof of
Proposition 1).
We distinguish in the analysis the case where the retailer faces a comparative disad-
vantage and the case where it benets from a comparative advantage.
Case 1: CPL (sNB)  cNB: cNBsNB 
sNB
2
:
We have the following threshold values in sPL:
bsPL < sNB < esPL
and the analysis results from the comparison between sPL and these threshold values.
 If 0 < sPL  bsPL, both qualities, sPL and sNB are sold at the equilibrium and
sPL < s

PL < sNB;
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 If bsPL < sPL  esPL, only sNB is sold;
 If sPL > esPL, both qualities, sPL and sNB are sold at the equilibrium, but sPL >
sNB.
Let a2

cNB
sNB

and a1

cNB
sNB

denote the following threshold values in a: a2

cNB
sNB

is
obtained by solving sPL = bsPL, which results in a2  cNBsNB = 3 cNBsNB while a1  cNBsNB is
obtained from sPL = esPL leading to a1  cNBsNB = 3

3sNB+
p
9s2NB 16cNB

8
.
We have,
 If a  a2

cNB
sNB

, both qualities, sPL and sNB are sold at the equilibrium with
sPL < s

PL < sNB;
 If a2

cNB
sNB

< a  a1

cNB
sNB

, only sNB is sold;
 If a > a1

cNB
sNB

, both qualities, sPL and sNB are sold at the equilibrium with
sPL > sNB.
We now turn to the case where the retailer benets from a comparative advantage.
Case 2: CPL (sNB) < cNB: cNBsNB >
sNB
2
.
We have the following threshold values in sPL:
esPL < sNB < bsPL.
The comparison between sPL and these threshold values leads to:
 If a  a2

cNB
sNB

, only sPL is sold (because of the comparative advantage of the
retailer);
 If a > a2

cNB
sNB

, both qualities, sPL and sNB are sold at the equilibrium with
sPL > sNB. Q.E.D.
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